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COVENANTING EXCHANGES WITH THE FRENCH COURT DURING THE WARS FOR THE THREE 
KINGDOMS. 
In 1638, ŝŶĂƌĞũĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŚĂƌůĞƐ/ ?ƐƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ Scots exercised their right of resistance by 
issuing the National Covenant which sought to impose permanent checks on monarchy in Kirk and 
state. Having constituted a Presbyterian regime in the Kirk at expense of the episcopacy, the Scottish 
Covenanters subsequently defeated Charles I in ƚŚĞŝƐŚŽƉƐ ?tĂƌƐof 1639-40. Thereafter, the 
Covenanting Movement sought to export revolution to England and Ireland in order to safeguard 
their attainment of legislative, executive and judicial power in Scotland. Armed intervention not only 
triggered off revolutions in England and Ireland, but also instigated the wars for the three kingdoms 
in the 1640s. 1  
tŚŝůĞƚŚĞĂĚǀĞŶƚŽĨ ‘EĞǁƌŝƚŝƐŚ,ŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? since the 1990s has led some English historians to 
take a more rounded picture of political developments within the British Isles, there is still a 
prevailing tendency to rely on official published sources when looking at diplomatic and 
international relations in assessing European ramifications.2 However, a new generation of Scottish 
and, to a lesser extent, Irish historians have opened up diplomatic history in a more thorough and 
archivally competent manner. Outstanding work has been accomplished in several key areas - on 
Swedish and Dutch support for the Scottish Covenanters;3 on Spanish and papal backing for the Irish 
Confederates; 4 on Scottish and British aid for the recovery of the German Palatinate during the 
Thirty Years War; and on the incapacity of Charles I to secure support from the Danes, the Spanish, 
the German Empire and the French. 5 Nevertheless, the importance of France to all protagonists in 
the wars for the three kingdoms remains relatively underworked.6 While a comprehensive review of 
the diplomatic links between France and the British Isles is beyond the scope of this paper, the 
intricacies of Covenanting exchanges with the French Court can at least be sketched out. 
I 
Scottish resistance to Charles I had European, not just British significance. Contemporaneous revolts 
in Portugal and Catalonia against a centralising Spanish monarchy protested against the escalating 
costs of engagement in the Thirty YĞĂƌƐ ?tĂƌ ? The Covenanting Movement brought this European 
war to the British Isles. In essence, tŚĞŝƐŚŽƉƐ ?tĂƌƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĚŝƚƐBritish theatre.7 Prior to the 
ŝƐŚŽƉƐ ?tĂƌƐ ?ŚĂƌůĞƐŚĂĚďĞĞŶƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚƚŽĂƐƐŝƐƚ^ƉĂŝŶĂŐŝŶƐƚƚŚĞƵƚĐŚǁŝƚŚ/ƌŝƐŚƚƌŽŽƉƐĂŶd 
English ships, ostensibly to secure the restoration of his nephew, Charles Louis to the Palatinate. In 
return for landing facilities for troops in transit through the Channel, the Spaniards became the best 
hope of Charles securing external assistance against the Covenanters. However, the Dutch decisively 
defeated the Spanish fleet in the Downs in the autumn of 1639. This defeat demonstrated that 
Charles was of limited assistance to the Habsburgs. It also ensured that the Covenanters continued 
to be supplied with men and munitions through Holland and Zealand.8  Indeed, the Covenanting 
Movement drew on diplomatic, military and material support from the reconstituted alliance of 
&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?^ǁĞĚĞŶĂŶĚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚWƌŽǀŝŶĐĞƐƚŚĂƚŚĂĚĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚƚŚĞdŚŝƌƚǇzĞĂƌƐ ?tĂƌ in the aftermath 
of the Peace of Prague between the Austrian Habsburgs and the German princes in 1635.  
The Covenanters had established their own Dutch press outlets by 1639, when they rather 
than the court of Charles I, were the first to receive embassies openly from Sweden and Denmark as 
well as covertly from France.9 Abbé Chambre alias Thomas Chalmers, a Scottish Jesuit first made 
contact with disaffected Scots in the autumn of 1637 under the guise of boosting recruitment for the 
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Scottish regiment in French service since 1633. Rewarded by becoming almoner to Cardinal François 
de Richelieu, Chambers ƌĞƚƵƌŶĞĚƚŽ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚƚŽƌĞƉŽƌƚŽŶŽǀĞŶĂŶƚŝŶŐĂĨĨĂŝƌƐƉƌŝŽƌƚŽƚŚĞŝƐŚŽƉƐ ?
Wars. Despite his religious affiliations, the Covenanters expediently used him as their chief contact 
with Richelieu. By 1640, Chambre was the unofficial Scottish envoy to the French Court.10  
 
There is no evidence from the Scottish side to link such covert contacts with the official 
French embassy to the Court of Charles I. Louis XIII in September 1638  had despatched  Pompone 
de Bellièvre, who took Jean de Montereul with him as his secretary. Montereul continued in England 
until June 1641.11 Neither de Bellièvre nor Montereul seem to have been associated with a letter 
drafted by the Covenanting leadership, but never delivered to the French Court in 1639. Charles I 
revealed the existence of this letter two days before the opening of the  “Short ? Parliament in 
London in April 1640, so-called because it was promptly dismissed after failing to vote funds for the 
king to oppose the Covenanters. The letter to the French Court had justified recourse to arms and 
XSKHOGIUHHFRQVWLWXWLRQDODVVHPEOLHVWRSUHYHQW6FRWODQGEHFRPLQJ³DFRQTXHUHGSURYLQFHDV,UHODQG
under subjection to EnglDQG´7KHUHZDVFHUWDLQO\QRLQWHQWWRUHQRXQFHWKH6WXDUWV1RUZHUHWKH
Covenanters seeking to transfer their allegiance to France ± an option exercised by the Catalans at the 
outset of 1641 after their revolt against the Spanish monarchy. The letter did allow Charles to taunt 
the commissioners sent from Scotland to negotiate with him whether they had coPH³DVDPEDVVDGRUV
RUDVVXEMHFWV´The commissioners were then detained. Their leader, John Campbell, Lord (later Earl 





Overt international support for the Covenanting Movement came primarily and substantially 
from Sweden. Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna, deeply concerned that the growing rapprochement 
between Charles I and the Habsburgs would inflame the perennial antipathies of Denmark-Norway 
and Poland-Lithuania, was notably receptive to Covenanting pleas for assistance made by Alexander 
Leslie, Field-Marshal and thirty-year veteran in Swedish service, who had actually returned to 
Scotland under a safe-conduct from Charles I. In June 1638, Leslie (later Earl of Leven) had informed 
Oxenstierna of his commitment to the Covenanting Movement. James Hamilton, Marquess (later 
Duke) of Hamilton was then king ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌŝŶ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚĐŚĂƌŐĞĚƚŽƉƌŽůŽŶŐŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚ
the Covenanters while Charles attempted to mobilise support overseas. ,ĂŵŝůƚŽŶ ?ƐŝŶĞƉƚŝƚƵĚĞĂƐ
ŬŝŶŐ ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĞƌǁĂƐĞǆƉŽƐĞĚŶŽƚŽŶůǇďǇŚŝƐĨĂŝůƵƌĞƚŽƐĞĐƵƌĞƚŚĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐŽĨ>ĞƐůŝĞĨŽƌƚŚĞ king, 
but in allowing the Field-Marshal to return to Sweden in July to secure political and military backing 
from the Swedish state council. Four months later, Leslie arrived back in Scotland in advance of the 
Glasgow Assembly that imposed Presbyterianism at the expense of episcopacy. He was equipped 
with arms and ammunition as a retirement present from Swedish service. Leslie was undoubtedly 
the prime mover in securing not only his own release but that of leading Scottish officers in Swedish 
and Dutch service for the &ŝƌƐƚŝƐŚŽƉƐ ?tĂƌ. By maintaining a regular correspondence with 
Oxenstierna, he paved the way for the further release of Scottish officers in advance of the Second 
ŝƐŚŽƉƐ ?tĂƌ ?ŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐďĂĐŬŝŶŐĨŽƌĂŶŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶŽĨŶŐůĂŶĚǁĂƐĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞĚĚƵring the Covenanting 
embassy of another military veteran, Colonel John Cochrane, in July-August 1640, when the Riksråd 
(Swedish Council) authorised further supplies of munitions and copper via Holland. At the same 
time, Charles was continuing to flounder in his search for overseas military backing and in his 




Having imposed permanent constitutional checks on monarchy by 1641, the Covenanting Movement 
proceeded with their/its? alternative Scottish agenda for the British Isles. This agenda reached a 
British accord through the Solemn League and Covenant in 1643, which brought the Covenanters 
onto the side of the Parliamentarians against the Royalists in return for the promotion of 
3 
 
Presbyterian uniformity in England and Ireland. But this agenda/unity? was subsumed/undermined? 
gradually by the splits among English Parliamentarians into the factions known as the Presbyterians 
and Independents from 1645 and was ultimately sundered after Charles I placed himself in the 
custody of the Covenanting Army in 1646. The radical mainstream of the Covenanting Movement, 
led by Archibald Campbell, Marquess of Argyll, were /was? intent upon a programme of confessional 
confederation to establish godly monarchy in association with godly commonwealths in all three 
Stuart kingdoms. The Covenanters offered a radical vision of a? Britain that was federative, 
constitutional and confessional. Argyll realised long before Oliver Cromwell that Charles I had to be 
defeated for this vision to be fulfilled.  
ƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƐŚŽƉƐ ?tĂƌƐ ?ƚŚĞŽǀĞŶĂŶƚŝŶŐůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉǁĞƌĞ/was? intent on securing covert 
support from France, the foremost European power in the continuing fight against the Spanish and 
Austrian Habsburgs. As early as January 1643, William Kerr, Earl of Lothian had been despatched to 
&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƚŽƌĞŝŶǀŝŐŽƌĂƚĞƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉƌŽĐĂůĐŝǀŝĐ ?ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂŶĚĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĂƵůĚĂůůŝĂŶĐĞ ? ?
but also to sound out the prospects of French backing for Charles I and the Catholic Confederates of 
Ireland. In the course of this mission Louis XIII died. The task of governing France on behalf of his 
infant son Louis XIV passed to a regency government headed by the Queen Mother, Anne of Austria, 
but dominated by Cardinal Jules Mazarin as first minister. During the nine months that Lothian 
remained in France, he ingratiated himself at the French Court by facilitating recruitment of Scottish 
troops to bolster the French presence in Germany and Italy. The fresh contingents sent from 
^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞŽǀĞŶĂŶƚŝŶŐDŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?ǁĞƌĞůĞĚďƌŝĞĨůǇďǇƌŐǇůů ?ƐŚĂůĨ-
ďƌŽƚŚĞƌ ?:ĂŵĞƐ ?ĂƌůŽĨ/ƌǀŝŶĞ ?ŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐƚŝĞƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝƐŚŽƉƐ ?tĂƌƐǁĞƌĞĂůƐŽƌĞǀŝƚĂůŝƐĞĚďǇ
>ŽƚŚŝĂŶ ?ƐĐŽŶƚĂĐƚǁŝƚŚďďĠŚĂŵďƌĞ ?ǁŚŽƐĞƚƵp a correspondence between the Queen Mother 
and Argyll. Lothian seems to have convinced Mazarin not to give military assistance to Charles I on 
the grounds that the combined forces of Scottish Covenanters and English Parliamentarians would 
be too strong for the Royalists and the Catholic Confederates in Ireland, with or without French 
reinforcements.14 
During his time in France, Lothian had informed Charles I of his diplomatic activities through 
his Secretary of State for Scottish Affairs, William Hamilton, Earl of Lanark (brother of the Marquess 
of Hamilton). On his return in October, he made a courtesy visit to the king at Oxford. Lothian was 
promptly arrested and incarcerated in Bristol Castle for six months. Ostensibly, he was imprisoned 
following reports that he was to serve as lieutenant-colonel in the Covenanting Army coming to the 
aid of the English Parliamentarians. But his close confinement also served to deny the Covenanting 
leadership accurate information about the situation at the French Court while an envoy, a certain 
Monsieur de Boisivon, was despatched to Scotland at the behest of Charles I. He was accredited not 
ďǇDĂǌĂƌŝŶŽƌƚŚĞYƵĞĞŶDŽƚŚĞƌ ?ďƵƚďǇƚŚĞŬŝŶŐ ?ƐƵŶĐůĞ ?'ĂƐƚŽŶ ?ƵĐĚ ?KƌůĠĂŶƐ ?dŚĞŬŝŶŐ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶ
against Lothian signposted renewed Royalist militancy. When Hamilton, who had refused to sign the 
Solemn League and Covenant, arrived at Oxford in December to report on the Scottish situation, he 
was denounced and thrown into prison. Lanark was dismissed as Secretary of State.15 
The French envoy turned out to be a rather quixotic, self-serving diplomat with a penchant 
for exaggeration and distortion that wholly undermined his credibility in France as well as Scotland. 
He claimed that Lothian had really been sent to France to treat with the Huguenots. The only 
evidence of Lothian being engaged outwith his official remit was when he used his stay to boost his 
library, furnishings and art collection. Argyll was correctly identified by de Boisivon as the controlling 
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influence in Scotland. His alleged absolutism (>ĞDĂƌƋƵŝƐĚ ?ƌŐƵĞŝůĞƐƚŝĐǇĂďƐŽůƵ) was pursued 
without any semblance of knowledge about foreign affairs which were left to the messianic 
inclinations of the Earl of Leven, who pressed for a Protestant Crusade that would soon extend from 
England to France and on to Rome to vanquish the Anti-Christ. These claims had the same ring of 
authenticity as the purported attempts of the Covenanting leadership to have him assassinated; 
claims belatedly made after he had retired from Edinburgh, heavily indebted from gambling 
throughout his November stay, to pursue hunting and other leisurely pursuits around Manchester.16 
His protracted posturing enabled the Covenanting leadership to spin reports on current affairs in 
order to heighten the sense of anticipation in England about the arrival of their Army, once 
adequately funded, to implement the Solemn League and Covenant. 
Although the Scots had stated their militant intent by re-occupying Berwick-upon-Tweed on 
20 September, another four months were to elapse before the Covenanting army began its push into 
England on 19 January 1644. In the interim, news management became a particular concern of 
Argyll and the radical leadership. The Covenanting Movement had been notably adept at exploiting 
the British ƉƌĞƐƐƚŽŝƚƐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞŽƵƚƐĞƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƐŚŽƉƐ ?tĂƌƐ ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐůǇ ?ŽŶ ?EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ
1643, the Covenanters had a statement published in London on The Readinesse of the Scots to 
Advance into England, which dealt with military preparations and with the last-ditch, but futile, 
attempts by the French envoy (now elevated to the status of ambassador) to prevent Scots aid to 
the Parliamentarians. Three newsletters immediately picked up this report. The True Informer 
accepted the Covenanting line uncritically if not verbatim. The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer 
embellished and editorialised the role of the French  ‘Ambassador ?, taking this as a warning to the 
Long Parliament (so-called as it lasted two decades) to be wary of dealing with the French Court. 
Scottish support was particularly welcomed as Charles I was expecting reinforcements from the 
Catholic Confederates in Ireland. However, the most supportive editorialising came from The 
Scottish Dove, which was dismissive of the endeavours of the French  ‘Ambassador ? and focused 
more on the advanced state of Scottish military preparations that merited prompt payment of the 
funds promised by the Parliamentarians for military assistance.17 
Covenanting military intervention in Ireland had become bogged down in the province of 
Ulster.  Intervention in England did contribute significantly to the Parliamentary victory over the 
Royalists at Marston Moor in Yorkshire on 2 July 1644. But no Covenanting forces were involved in 
the decisive Royalist defeat at Naseby in Northamptonshire on 14 June 1645. Nevertheless, the 
Covenanters were instrumental in establishing the Committee of Both Kingdoms which, between 
February 1644 and October 1646, oversaw the conduct of civil war in England and Ireland and 
promoted international relations on behalf of the Covenanters and Parliamentarians. Despite 
growing antipathies/conflict? among Covenanters and Parliamentarians on the war effort and the 
failure to implement Presbyterian uniformity, the Parliamentarians readily associated with the 
Covenanters to build up their diplomatic credibility. Thus, William Fiennes, Viscount Saye & Seal 
ũŽŝŶĞĚǁŝƚŚƌŐǇůů ?ƐĐůŽƐĞĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞ ?^ŝƌƌĐŚŝďĂůĚ Johnson of Wariston, to write on behalf of the 
Committee, now projected as Concilium Amborum Magnae Britanniae, a letter of assurance to 
Christian IV of Denmark-Norway in June 1645. They sought both to dispel/see off any 
revived/renewed inclination of/on the part of the Danish king to assist his nephew Charles I and to 
restrict shipments of arms that would aid the Royalist cause.18 
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The Scottish commissioners serving on the Committee retained international influence in 
two key areas  W the Palatinate and France. In 1642, Lothian had persuaded Elector Charles Louis not 
to become embroiled in the Royalist cause. Instead he should place his hopes on regaining the 
Palatinate through the joint endeavours of the Covenanters and Parliamentarians. Lothian, in turn, 
was receptive to overtures from the Elector in 1643 to lobby on his behalf at the French Court. The 
Elector in the course of 1644 and again in 1645 pushed the Scots on the Committee for assistance in 
the recovery of the Palatinate, even stating on the former occasion that he would come to London 
to lobby in person. But he had to be content with a statement endorsed by Saye & Seal and 
Wariston that his restoration would be a British priority once issues of war and peace were resolved 
with Charles I. The Scottish commissioners in London as well as the Covenanting leadership in 
Edinburgh were also intent on maintaining their own distinctive as well as joint British links to France 
following the failure of tripartite peace negotiations with the king at Uxbridge in February 1645.19 
III 
As shaped by Argyll and his radical associates, the key features of Covenanting policy during the 
period of English intervention were a demonstrable concern with confederal union, a pragmatic 
willingness to temper military force with peace negotiations and an international commitment to 
Protestantism not just Presbyterianism. From their arrival in London in February 1644, the Scottish 
commissioners were committed to the pursuit of war against the Royalists. But they did not rule out 
a negotiated peace with the king and the Parliamentarians that would be consistent with the British 
aspirations of the Covenanting Movement and the international standing of the Solemn League and 
Covenant. They were determined to be represented separately in any peace negotiations 20  
Accordingly, the Covenanting leadership was not content that peace negotiations, which 
opened at Uxbridge in November 1644, should simply tighten up on bilateral propositions between 
Parliamentarians and Royalists that had failed to secure agreement at Oxford in February 1643. The 
Scottish commissioners certainly respected issues of mutual concern raised by the Parliamentarians 
such as control over the militia, executive and judiciary; effecting religious reformation; the removal 
ŽĨĚĞůŝŶƋƵĞŶƚĐŽƵŶƐĞůůŽƌƐĂŶĚƚŚĞĞǆĞŵƉƚŝŽŶŽĨŶĂŵĞĚ ‘ŵĂůŝŐŶĂŶƚƐ ?ĨƌŽŵƉĂƌĚŽŶ ?/ŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽƐĞĐƵƌĞ
a lasting peace between the king and the Parliamentarians, the commissioners were instructed to 
negotiate with a degree of flexibility even on the promotion of Presbyterian uniformity according to 
a Scottish prescription. The Scottish commissioners were especially determined that funding for the 
Covenanting forces in Ireland should be regularised and that the British in Ireland were to be obliged 
to subscribe to the Solemn League and Covenant. The Covenanters were also resolved that no 
Scottish peer should be held to account in England for transgressions in Scotland.21   
However, this Scottish package was not attractive to the king and did not enjoy unequivocal 
support from the Parliamentarians. Charles I remained adamantly opposed to a covenanted 
monarchy or to making any meaningful concessions in England that would diminish his power to the 
ůĞǀĞůƐĞĐƵƌĞĚďǇƚŚĞŽǀĞŶĂŶƚĞƌƐŝŶ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚďǇ ? ? ? ? ?ŚĂƌůĞƐ ?ƐƌĞƐŽůǀĞŶŽƚƚŽĐŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐĞǁĂƐ
stiffened by support from Queen Henrietta Maria and Lord George Digby. The king was also hoping 
to firm up the cessation between Confederates and Royalists in Ireland (operative since September 
1643) into a treaty. Substantial reinforcements for his war-effort in England would be secured, it was 
hoped, through a comprehensive toleration for Irish Catholics.  Committed to the Stuart monarchy 
the Covenanters had no real alternative to Charles I. Elector Charles Louis was reported to have 
subscribed to the Solemn League and Covenant while in the United Provinces in March 1644. Within 
Royalist circles there were continuing but unfounded fears that he was being lined up to replace his 
uncle. However, his restoration to the Palatinate appeared more likely with French assistance than 
his intrusion into the British succession. His two younger brothers, Princes Rupert and Maurice, were 
tainted through their martial association with the Royalist cause. A regency government appeared 
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out of the question as the Queen stood solidly with Charles and both the Prince of Wales (the future 
Charles II) and James, Duke of York enjoyed the protection of France and the United Provinces.  
Outright republicanism remained a distinctive minority pursuit in England. Nonetheless, 
there were growing concerns within the Covenanting Movement that the Parliamentary war 
grouping was becoming less committed to a Stuart monarchy when the peace negotiations at 
Uxbridge broke up in February 1645; concerns compounded by the subsequent emergence of the 
New Model Army. The Covenanters also suffered from a piece of Royalist mischief making. The 
publication of intercepted letters revealed that the civil war in Scotland was not running in favour of 
the Covenanters. At the same time, renewed solidarity between radicals and conservatives brokered 
between Argyll and Lanark suggested that the Covenanters were prepared to exploit divisions 
among the Parliamentarians to reach an accommodation with Charles I. 22  
The Scots had actually entered the peace negotiations with alternative fields of engagement 
beckoning; a situation that remained open following the failure of Uxbridge. In the aftermath of 
Marston Moor, the Covenanters had actively debated confederation with Sweden to facilitate the 
wresting of the provinces to the east of the Øresund from Christian IV of Denmark. The acquisition of 
these provinces by Sweden would eradicate the tolls crippling the Scottish trade to and from the 
Baltic. The Swedes were intent on renewing the recruitment of hjaelptrupperne from Scotland and 
Hugh Mowatt, the émigré Scot who had been despatched as envoy to both Scotland and England in 
the spring of 1644, stepped up his hitherto unsuccessful recruitment efforts. Chancellor Oxenstierna 
also wrote to the same effect to his Scottish counterpart Loudoun just before negotiations 
commenced at Uxbridge. Notwithstanding the warm reception accorded to Mowatt by leading 
Covenanters in both London and Edinburgh, neither he nor Oxenstierna was promised troops. While 
stating his intention to lay/raise? the issue before the Committee of Both Kingdoms, Loudoun was 
adamant that no assistance could be forthcoming until a lasting peace was secured with the king and 
Presbyterianism established in England. Nevertheless, Swedish overtures had added to the tensions 
between the Covenanters and Parliamentarians at Uxbridge.23   
The withdrawal of Swedish troops from the German theatre to fight in the Northern War of 
1643-45 against Denmark-Norway, made the French determined to increase recruitment from the 
British Isles, which Mazarin and the Queen Mother felt could best be achieved by the promotion of 
peace between Charles I, the Covenanters and the Parliamentarians. Building upon the foundations 
laid by Richelieu, Mazarin sought to wrest from Spain the mantle of universal monarchy for France. 
By Uxbridge, French forces were not only committed in Germany but also lined up, with varying 
degrees of success, against Spain in Italy, Catalonia and Flanders. Their presence in the latter theatre 
was of concern to the Dutch as well as the Parliamentarians. France sought Irish as well as Scottish 
recruits. However, French diplomatic links with the Catholic Confederates were relatively low key. 
Certainly, Mazarin was aware that the putative conversion of the cessation into a peace treaty 
between Royalists and Confederates haĚƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůŶŽƚŽŶůǇƚŽƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵŚĂƌůĞƐ/ ?ƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
prospects in England, but also to release Irish forces for French service. Yet, there was a tacit 
recognition at the French Court that Spanish influence over the Irish carried more weight.24  
At the same time, where the French were studiously vague in their promises to the Irish, 
Mazarin and the Queen Mother, in the name of Louis XIV, had actually despatched a statement of 
intent to Chancellor >ŽƵĚŽƵŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚƚŽƌĞŝŶǀŝŐŽƌĂƚĞƚŚĞ ‘ĂƵůĚ ĂůůŝĂŶĐĞ ? ?dŚŝƐ
statement coincided with the breakdown of negotiations at Uxbridge in February 1645. In the 
following month, Loudoun accredited Sir Robert Moray to be colonel of the Scottish regiment 
formerly commanded by the late Earl of Irvine. Moray, in turn, was to become the principal 
diplomatic agent to negotiate further Scottish forces in return for a firm alliance. To this end, 
Mazarin, notwithstanding papal overtures to provide armed assistance to Charles I, was also willing 
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to promote peace between the Royalists and Parliamentarians that would facilitate the withdrawal 
of the Covenanting Army from England. Once in Paris, Moray encouraged Henrietta Maria to 
become more flexible. But the exiled Queen, like Charles I, had been heartened by Royalist successes 
in Scotland and was still insistent that the Covenanters would have to abandon the imposition of 
Presbyterianism on England if there was to be any prospect of a meaningful peace.25 
Undoubtedly, the rise of the New Model Army and triumphal intransigence among 
Independents were negative influences on such a prospect from the Parliamentary side. Charles I 
discounted any suggestion of replacing an Anglican with Presbyterian establishment as this shift 
would imperil his immortal soul. Indeed, he was incapable of making meaningful concessions on the 
ƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐŝƐƐƵĞ ?dŚĞŽǀĞŶĂŶƚĞƌƐ ?ƌĞƐŽůǀĞƚŽƌĞĂĐŚĂŶĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŬŝŶŐƐƵĨĨĞƌĞĚĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůůǇ
ǁŚĞŶŚĂƌůĞƐ ?ƐƐĞĐƌĞƚĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶĐĞƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐĂŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞĚƉĞĂĐĞǁĂƐŝŶƚĞƌĐĞƉƚĞĚĂŶĚƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ
in part by ƚŚĞWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂƌŝĂŶƐŝŶƚŚĞǁĂŬĞŽĨEĂƐĞďǇ ?ĂĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚůĂŝĚďĂƌĞƚŚĞŬŝŶŐ ?Ɛ
untrustworthiness as well as the straightened financial circumstances of the Royalist cause.26  
The Covenanters, while immoveable on the commitment of the Solemn League and 
Covenant to Presbyterian uniformity, were prepared to negotiate with latitude on the other key 
issues discussed at Uxbridge, notably the militia and Ireland. This greater flexibility was a sign of the 
revival of pragmatic conservatism brought about by the rehabilitation of Lanark among the 
Covenanting leadership in Edinburgh and by the growing prominence of John Maitland, Earl of 
Lauderdale among the Scottish commissioners at London. Preoccupied with civil war raging in 
Scotland north of the Tay and in protecting his estates from devastation by Royalist clans, Argyll was 
in danger of taking his eye off the diplomatic ball. The Parliamentary triumph at Naseby had, 
however, regalvanised French diplomacy and encouraged the more conservatively inclined 
Covenanters to contemplate a bilateral peace with Charles I. At the same time, the reluctance of the 
Covenanting Army to leave their/its? garrisons in northern England made Charles more susceptible 
to French overtures for peace. Royalist successes in Scotland, through the brilliant/bloody? guerrilla 
ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŝŶŐŽĨ:ĂŵĞƐ'ƌĂŚĂŵ ?DĂƌƋƵĞƐƐŽĨDŽŶƚƌŽƐĞ ?ǁĂƐƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŬŝŶŐ ?Ɛ hand against 
Argyll and the radicals, who could not be induced/brought to disown a tripartite British solution.27 
Two months after Naseby, Jean de Montereul arrived in London as the French envoy 
empowered by Mazarin to pursue peace. Considerably less subtle than Mazarin in the promotion of 
French politique, Montereul prioritised Royalist and Covenanter interests. In the process, he was 
prepared to work against Swedish endeavours to promote confederation and recruit troops, leading 
the under-resourced and under-instructed Mowatt to complain to Oxenstierna that the French no 
less than the Danes were hostile diplomatic influences in London (if not yet in Edinburgh). From 
August 1645 until May 1646, Montereul worked in association with Sir Robert Moray in London and 
Paris to secure a bilateral if not a tripartite peace. Montereul and Moray were able to draw on the 
increasing prominence of Lauderdale among the Scottish commissioners in London. Montereul also 
worked assiduously with Henry Rich, 1st Earl of Holland, a pragmatic Royalist more at home in 
London than in Oxford and well connected to the Presbyterian faction in Parliament. Holland was 
also a longstanding associate of the still imprisoned Hamilton and his brother Lanark.28 
Montereul and Holland originally hoped that Charles I would come to London and push for 
peace with the assistance of the Presbyterian faction. However, hard-liners within the Royalist camp, 
led by Lord Digby, were more prepared to countenance an accommodation with the Independents. 
Their belief in gathered churches/congregations? of the godly nationwide rather than a single 
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ecclesiastical establishment for England opened up the prospect of toleration rather than 
eradication for Anglicanism; a position from which Charles I also derived hope. Nevertheless, 
Montereul and Mazarin pressed for the alternative of the king seeking safe custody with the Scots 
who were repelled by the rampant sectarianism and the growing strain of republicanism among the 
Independents. Military relations between the Independents and the Scots were close to breaking 
point. The Scots complained persistently about the continuing shortages of money and supplies from 
Parliament. The Independents were outraged by the Scots unilateral resort to local assessments, 
free quarters and occasional/frequent? depredations in the north of England. They also harboured 
exaggerated fears that France and Scotland would formulate an international alliance involving 
Sweden and Denmark to restore Charles I to power in England. Both radical and conservative 
Covenanters were contemplating war between the two kingdoms following the eventual movement 
of General Leven in November 1645 to lay siege to Newark in Northamptonshire.29  
The ending of the Scottish civil war in favour of the Covenanting Movement, which left 
ŚĂƌůĞƐ/ “in deep melancholy and despair ? ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŚĞŐƌŽǁŝŶŐpolitical hostility among 
Presbyterians and Independents in England allowed Montereul and Mazarin additional scope to 
press for the option of Scottish custody. Henrietta Maria, now lodged at St Germain outside Paris, 
was encouraged to put pressure on her husband to come to some accommodation over the Solemn 
League and Covenant and the establishment of Presbyterianism in England. An increasingly 
exasperated Montereul eventually persuaded Charles I to abandon his court at Oxford and throw in 
his lot with the Covenanters. Two months after the formal capitulation of Royalist forces in England, 
the king surrendered to General Leven at Newark on 5 May 1646. But this was only after Charles had 
attempted a feint towards London in a forlorn hope of rapprochement with the Independents. 
Montereul was less than enthused by the Covenanting response to the arrival of the king. Lothian, 
into whose custody the king was entrusted, led the reassertion of radical control over proceedings. 
Charles was required to order the surrender of the besieged Royalist garrison in Newark, to disband 
the Royalist forces in Scotland and to sign the Solemn League and Covenant. His refusal to undertake 
the latter or even to signify his acceptance of its validity ensured that he was placed in protective 
custody as the Covenanting Army promptly withdrew to Newcastle.30 
IV 
Although the Covenanters had actively been considering a further round of talks with the king since 
autumn 1645, the Parliamentarians only seem to have given renewed impetus to peace proposals at 
the outset of 1646. Their revised position was eventually formulated as the Newcastle Propositions 
in July.  The Covenanters, whether of a radical or conservative hue, remained reluctant to alter their 
standpoint at Uxbridge in 1644-5. The Covenanters were also unconvinced that the Parliamentarians 
were exerting any meaningful pressure on Charles I to take the Solemn League and Covenant. The 
Scottish Army in Ulster was decisively defeated by the Catholic Confederates at Benburb in County 
Tyrone on 5 June 1646. The major casuaůƚǇǁĂƐƚŚĞŽǀĞŶĂŶƚĞƌƐ ?ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
Parliamentarians in Ireland. The exclusion of Scots from ongoing discussions on Irish affairs was 
again viewed as breaching the spirit of the Solemn League. While there was little doubt that Scottish 
participation on the Committee of Both Kingdoms had run its course, the Covenanting leadership 
was insistent that the making of peace and war were common issues for Scotland and England.31 
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Argyll, the driving force behind a British confederation, had attempted to transcend divisions 
between Parliamentarians and Covenanters, and within the ranks of both. English intransigence 
towards an accommodation had grown now that the king was in Covenanting custody. The House of 
Lords still exercised a restraining influence on the Scotophobia then rampant in the House of 
Commons/Lower House which maintained that the disposal of the king was a purely English not a 
British matter. Internal divisions between Presbyterians and Independents were a further 
complication, especially as the New Model Army inclined towards the latter in terms of restricting 
royal authority and promoting religious toleration. The Covenanters were increasingly restless about 
the continuing cost of military intervention in England and Ireland. Argyll was also experiencing 
increasing difficulty in holding together the radical mainstream of the Movement.32  At the 
outset/beginning? of June, Argyll joined with Loudoun and Leven, to issue a robust defence of the 
Scottish position. They called for the Committee of Both Kingdoms to be re-convened at Newcastle 
to resolve a unified approach to peace and in handling the king. Argyll was hoping Charles would 
moderate his position sufficiently to take stock of the Newcastle Propositions from the Long 
Parliament.  However, Charles was prepared neither to trust Argyll nor to compromise on religious 
issues.33 
For his part, Argyll went to London to make a celebrated speech to the Grand Committee of 
Both Houses on 25 June that reaffirmed his credentials as the foremost British confederate in the 
three kingdoms. In formally signifying Covenanting consent to the Newcastle Proposition, Argyll 
stated that the Scots had a natural affection towards their monarch,  “ǁŚĞƌĞďǇƚŚĞǇǁŝƐŚŚĞŵĂǇďĞ
rather Reformed ƚŚĂŶZƵŝŶĞĚ ?.  Accordingly, the Long Parliament should not negotiate unilaterally 
with Charles I; the Covenanting forces in England and Ireland should be promptly supplied; and 
tensions between the New Model Army and the Covenanting Army in England should be headed off. 
Argyll was wholly dismissive that any settlement with the king would serve to unite Irish and Scottish 
Royalists with the Presbyterians in England. Argyll, however, had earlier journeyed to Ireland in 
March, both to apprise himself of the deplorable state of the under-funded and under-supplied 
forces, but also to arrange for three regiments of 2100 men to be brought over to Scotland. 
Originally the Covenanting leadership had intended to use these forces to mop up lingering Royalist 
resistance on the western seaboard of Scotland. But, Argyll was prepared to redeploy them to 
England in the event of war breaking out between Covenanters and Parliamentarians.34 
dŚĞŬŝŶŐ ?ƐĂǀĞƌƐŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞEĞǁĐĂƐƚůĞWƌŽƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐůĞĨƚŚĞŽǀĞŶĂŶƚŝŶŐůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚlittle 
alternative but to negotiate an honourable withdrawal from England. Nevertheless, their retention 
of the king until a satisfactory recompense for past services was agreed increased the ire of the 
Independents, detached the Presbyterians and led to a marked decline in support from their most 
steadfast constituency, the city of London. Following diligent, but fruitless, attempts to convince 
Charles I at Newcastle on the godly merits of Presbyterianism, the Kirk in September gave voice to 
widespread concerns among radicals about the intransigence of the king, his continuing 
encouragement of disaffected forces in Scotland and his suspect dealings with the French Court. In 
these circumstances, Loudoun was insisting at the outset of October that the disposal of the king 
was to be effected by joint advice and consent of both kingdoms.35 
The initiative in negotiating final terms for the withdrawal of the Covenanting Army and 
handing over the king was taken by the Presbyterians, who saw a satisfactory resolution without 
recourse to war threatened by the Independents as a means to consolidate their control over the 
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Long Parliament. Compensation of £400,000 sterling was secured and the Covenanters agreed that 
this sum should be paid in equal instalments, the initial two payments when the Covenanting army 
withdrew from England with the third and fourth to follow when funds became available. This sum 
was equivalent to the money the Covenanters had actually received from the Parliamentarians since 
January 1644; yet still offered scant reward to the hard-pressed Scottish forces in Ulster who were 
now more inclined/likely? to receive prayers than payment. With Montereul temporarily recalled, 
Pompone de Bellièvre, the president of the Paris Parlement had been dispatched as an ambassador 
from France to mediate between the king and the Parliamentarians in July 1646. Ambassador de 
Bellièvre was instructed that Mazarin would prefer a tripartite peace. In addition, he was to keep 
open the option of a bilateral deal notwithstanding growing doubts at the French Court about 
Scottish intentions towards the king. Although de Bellièvre attended/waited assiduously on Charles I 
and Montereul shuttled between Paris, London, Newcastle and Edinburgh, the king remained as 
obstinate to French as to Scottish overtures/pressures to negotiate. Lingering hopes that Charles 
would take stock of the gravity of his situation and accept the Newcastle Propositions were dashed 
on 20 December.36  
Freed from captivity and restored to the Scottish Estates that reconvened on 3 November 
1646, Hamilton took over the leadership of the conservative Covenanters whose strength had been 
built up discreetly by Lanark with covert assistance from Lauderdale. Hamilton had intruded himself 
in the peace negotiations in an attempt to delay giving up the king until his safety was firmly 
ĂƐƐƵƌĞĚ ?ĞƐƉŝƚĞ,ĂŵŝůƚŽŶ ?ƐƐƚĞƌůŝŶŐĞŶĚĞĂǀŽƵƌƐ ?ƌŐǇůůǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂŝĚŽĨtĂƌŝƐƚŽŶƌĞĂƐƐĞƌƚĞĚƌĂĚŝĐĂů
control over Covenanting negotiations with the king and Parliamentarians. Argyll had also secured 
solid backing from the Kirk which on 19 December issued a powerful condemnation of all 
clandestine diplomatic dealings and compared the activities of Royalist sympathisers to that of 
ůŽĐƵƐƚƐ ?ƌŐǇůů ?ƐŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚEstates was duly affirmed when a radical 
motion that an unconvenanted king should not be brought to Scotland was carried by 25 votes in a 
highly-charged parliamentary debate. This vote among the 154 members on 16 January 1647 
ensured that Charles was left at Newcastle, where he was duly handed over to the Parliamentarians 
fourteen days later. The Covenanters had received no guarantees for his safety or for the future of 
the Stuart monarchy in England, save from a vague promise from the Long Parliament to sustain 
British confederation in terms of the Solemn League and Covenant. 37 
V 
With the transfer of Charles I from the Covenanters to the Parliamentarians and his lodging in 
Holmby Castle, Northamptonshire, the political initiative appeared to pass/have passed to the 
Presbyterians who were still committed to a negotiated peace with the king, if not the Scots. 
However, Argyll was not confident that the Presbyterians in England could reach a binding 
accommodation with the king that would satisfy both Parliamentarians and Covenanters. His 
downgrading of peace negotiations with Charles I gave substance to the opinions of the French 
diplomats, Bellièvre in London and Montereul in Edinburgh, that the Covenanters, having removed 
themselves from the centre stage of British politics, were struggling to stay in the wings. Indeed, 
Bellièvre was keen that both the Presbyterians and the city of London distance themselves from the 
ŽǀĞŶĂŶƚĞƌƐ ?dŽƚŚŝƐĞŶĚ ?ŚĞƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚĞWƌĞƐďǇƚĞƌŝĂŶƐ ?ƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŬŝŶŐďĞďƌŽƵŐŚƚƚo 
London without being obliged to subscribe to the Solemn League and Covenant, and that 
Presbyterianism was established for a trial period of three years in the Church of England. However, 
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Bellièvre was wary of any backlash from Independents that would afford leverage to Spain to 
propose a triple alliance with them and the Dutch to prevent further French incursions in the 
Spanish Netherlands. Montereul was more circumspect. While he remained deeply sceptical that 
either conservative or radical Covenanters wŽƵůĚƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇƉƌŽŵŽƚĞƚŚĞƌĞƐƚŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŬŝŶŐ ?Ɛ
authority in all three kingdoms, he saw immediate advantage to France if Scotland continued to be 
supported as an irritant to both the Presbyterians and Independents in England. Moreover, the 
withdrawal of the Covenanting Army from England opened up the prospect of recruiting far more 
troops for French service.38 
British politics did not follow the French script, however. Five months after Charles I was 
transferred from the Covenanters to the Parliamentarians and lodged in Holmby Castle in 
Northamptonshire, he was forcibly removed by troops loyal to Oliver Cromwell and imprisoned on 
the Isle of Wight. This caused outrage among the more conservatively inclined nobility in Scotland 
who had faced purging from political office in the wake of the civil war and, simultaneously, played 
into the hands of Hamilton. While the Scottish commissioners who remained in London continued to 
be consulted on foreign and domestic matters relating to British politics, Lauderdale openly switched 
ŚŝƐĂůůĞŐŝĂŶĐĞĨƌŽŵƌŐǇůů ?ĂƐďƌŝĞĨůǇĚŝĚ>ŽƵĚŽƵŶŽŶƚŚĞƉƌŽŵƉƚŝŶŐŽĨ,ĂŵŝůƚŽŶ ?ƐďƌŽƚŚĞƌ>ĂŶĂƌŬ ?
Argyll had a more considered British position than Hamilton, in terms of collaboration between 
Covenanters and Parliamentarians.  He diligently maintained his contacts among Presbyterians and 
Independents in both the Lords and the Commons. Argyll was also less concerned than Hamilton at 
the growing dominance of the Independents in association with the New Model Army. In keeping 
with his depictiŽŶďǇDŽŶƚĞƌĞƵůŝŶ:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ?ĂƐ “ŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚƐŽĨƚŚŝƐŝƐůĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŚĂƐĚŽŶĞ
ŵŽƐƚŚĂƌŵƚŽƚŚĞŬŝŶŐ ? ?ƌŐǇůů ?ƐƐƚĂŶĐĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƌĂƉƉƌŽĐŚĞŵ ŶƚǁŝƚŚŚĂƌůĞƐ/ƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĂƚŽĨĂŶ
uncompromising British confederate. Covenanting attainments in Kirk and State could not be 
secured until the king subscribed both Covenants and accepted unconditionally the establishment of 
Presbyterianism throughout his three kingdoms. Montereul appeared to reverse his opinion of the 
Marquess in the following month, when he informĞĚDĂǌĂƌŝŶ ? “/ŬŶŽǁŶŽ^ĐŽƚƐŵĂŶŚĞƌĞŵŽƌĞ
ƐŝŶĐĞƌĞĂŶĚŵŽƌĞĨĂŝƚŚĨƵůƚŽŚŝƐƉƌŝŶĐĞ ? ?ƵƚDŽŶƚĞƌĞƵůǁĂƐŝŶĚƵůŐŝŶŐŚĞĂǀŝůǇŝŶŝƌŽŶǇ ?,ĞƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚ
ĂĚĂŵĂŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽǀĞŶĂŶƚŝŶŐůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ŶŽƚǁŝƚŚƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐĂŶǇ “ƐŚĂŵĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
Argyll and Hamilton, was far more committed to securing the £200,000 sterling still owed by the 
Parliamentarians for the transferred custody of the king than in restoring monarchical authority.39 
 
As Argyll and Hamilton had actually colluded in maintaining rather than disbanding the 
Covenanting Army, Montereul was adamant that they were as liable to work with as against each 
other ?DŽŶƚĞƌĞƵůŶĞǀĞƌĐĂŵĞƚŽƚĞƌŵƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŚĂƚƌŐǇůů ? “ǁŚŽǁŝůůŶŽƚďƌŽŽŬŚĂǀŝŶŐĂ
ŵĂƐƚĞƌ ?ĂŶĚ,ĂŵŝůƚŽŶ ?ǁŚŽ “ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚǁĂŶƚĂĐŽŵƉĂŶŝŽŶ ? ?ĂĐƚƵĂlly enjoyed good personal relations 
while the former operated as a radical and the latter as a conservative. They did not conspire to 
bring about the ruin of the Stuart monarchy. Indeed, while they disagreed over the prospects of 
reaching a satisfactory acĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚĂŵŽŶĂƌĐŚǁŚŽŵDŽŶƚĞƌĞƵůŚĞůĚƚŽďĞĂĨĨůŝĐƚĞĚďǇ “ŚŝƐ
ŶĂƚƵƌĂůŝƌƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?ƚŚĞǇďŽƚŚĂŐƌĞĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŬĞǇƚŽĂŶǇƌŝƚŝƐŚƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚĨŽƌƚŚĞrestoration of 
the Stuart monarchy was to bring the Prince of Wales (the future Charles II) to Scotland. However, 
there was no prospect that this would be accomplished as a joint endeavour. In any case, bringing 
the Prince to Scotland was staunchly resisted by Montereul and by Pierre de Bellièvre, who had 
replaced his brother Pompone as French Ambassador in London in October 1647.  Montereul was 
particularly insistent that Mazarin caution Queen Henrietta Maria against allowing the Prince of 
Wales to fall into the clutches of Hamilton or Argyll. The acquisition of the Prince of Wales would not 
necessarily assist Charles I, as both Hamilton and Argyll were liable to use his arrival in Scotland as a 
means of raising their bargaining position with the Independents and the New Model Army. If France 
was seen to countenance the departure of the Prince of Wales for Scotland it would compromise her 
room for diplomatic manoeuvre with the Parliamentarians and facilitate Spanish overtures for an 




Nevertheless, Lauderdale, Loudoun and Lanark secretly concluded the Engagement with 
Charles I in Carisbrooke Castle on 26 December 1647, to defend and restore the authority of 
Britannic monarchy.41 Under the Britannic Engagement, which came into force in 1648, Charles was 
not obliged to subscribe the Covenants. Ideological imperatives were further diluted by the 
stipulation that Presbyterianism would be imposed on England for no more than a trial period of 
three years. This effective abrogatŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŽǀĞŶĂŶƚĞƌƐ ? revolutionary platform in favour of a 
negotiating position put forward earlier by the Presbyterians but not accepted by Charles I was 
intolerable to Argyll and the radicals, who enjoyed vociferous support from the Kirk. The 
Engagement effectively conceded that the Covenanters had lost the political initiative within the 
British Isles. Simultaneously, it represented a reactionary effort to reassert aristocratic dominance 
and promote a conservative resurgence in all three kingdoms.42  
However, Scottish armed intervention in a renewed phase of civil war during 1648 only 
ďƌŝĞĨůǇƌĂŝƐĞĚƚŚĞŚŽƉĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŶŐůŝƐŚZŽǇĂůŝƐƚƐ ?dŚĞŶŐĂŐĞƌƐ ?ŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶǁĂƐŶŽƚĐŽ-ordinated with 
localised resistance in Wales, Kent and Essex, nor with the brief Royalist resurgence on the English 
Border, nor with the naval mutiny in the Downs. French diplomatic brokerage notwithstanding, the 
Engagers did not make common cause with the Royalist coalition led by Ormond and Inchiquin in 
Ireland, where the withdrawal of Covenanting forces under Sir George Munro had hastened the 
demise of the armed Scottish presence in Ulster. Indeed de Bellièvre and especially Montereul acted 
less as diplomatic brokers than as perceptive commentators on political rivalries.43 In England, the 
Britannic Engagement revived Scotophobia and the desire of the Independents to be quit of the 
Solemn League and Covenant. The Presbyterians remained aloof although they had been 
intermittently suspected by the Independents and the Army for wishing to bring back Scottish forces 
during 1647. Their residual commitment to the cause of both kingdoms took solace from the refusal 
of Argyll, Leven and his second in command, David Leslie to participate in an expeditionary force that 
ďĞŐĂŶƚŽƵŶƌĂǀĞůƵŶĚĞƌ,ĂŵŝůƚŽŶ ?ƐƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?dŚĞŶŐĂŐĞƌƐǁĞƌĞƐŽƵŶĚůǇ
defeated by Cromwell at Preston, Lancashire on 17 August. 44   
In advance of the Engagers crossing the Border into England, Montereul took his leave from 
Scotland in July. In a valedictory address from Edinburgh, Montereul had made clear to Mazarin that 
Franco-Scottish relationƐǁĞƌĞďƵƚ “ƚŚĞƐŚĂĚŽǁŽĨĂŶŽůĚĂůůŝĂŶĐĞ ? ?EĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ?ŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽ
entreaties from radicals as well as conservatives, his brother Mathieu, who had arrived that June, 
was left as a resident French presence in Edinburgh. Still not convinced that the Engagers prioritised 
the restoration of Charles I over improving their negotiating position with the Independents and the 
New Model Army, Montereul strenuously exhorted Mazarin to ensure that the French Court offered 
no more than good wishes along with limited supplies of arms and ammunition. On no account was 
France to be compromised in England to the advantage of Spain. He made no meaningful effort to 
contact Charles I on the Isle of Wight once he arrived in London en route for Paris. 45 
Once news of the defeat at Preston filtered back to Scotland, the radicals in western districts 
staged a successful revolt which commenced with the Whiggamore Raid on Edinburgh in September. 
Argyll and his supporters were checked temporarily at Stirling by Lanark, reinforced by the forces 
from Ireland under Munro. But, armed support from Oliver Cromwell, who had come into Scotland 
to assist the radicals, persuaded the Engagers to give up the reins of government. Although 
Cromwell contemplated and many Scots feared a conquest, he was content to reinstall Argyll and 





The radical regime that came to power in Scotland at the outset of 1649 was intent on 
redressing the unremitting centralism within the Covenanting Movement over the past eleven years 
and to a programme of social restructuring. 46 However, such radical programming was overtaken by 
news of the execution of Charles I on 30 January 1649. In England, as in Scotland, there had been an 
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞĐŽƵƉĚ ?ĠƚĂƚďǇƌĂĚŝĐĂůĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶůĂƚĞ ? ? ? ? that were led by Cromwell and were intent upon 
regicide and republicanism in which the English commonwealth became a free state and duly 
annexed Ireland and Scotland.47 By this juncture, France was convulsed by the Frondes, whose 
outbreak had coincided with the implementation of the Britannic Engagement. Political posturing 
notwithstanding, French diplomatic endeavours between 1643 and 1648 were marked largely by 
perceptive positioning and persistent persuasion. However, the French Court was powerless to 
prevent the execution of Charles I or the subsequent occupation of Scotland by Cromwell and the 
regicides, who returned not as comrades but as conquerors in 1650-51. 
Between 1649 and 1651, Argyll stage-managed the patriotic accommodation under which 
radical Covenanters eventually fought alongside former Engagers and Royalists for Charles II, whom 
they recognized and had crowned as King of Great Britain and Ireland. Indeed, Argyll used his 
political influence within the exiled household of Queen Henrietta Maria and at the French Court, 
through his strong personal links with Mathieu de Montereul as the Edinburgh resident, to help 
persuade Charles II to ally with the radical Covenanters. Notwithstanding attempts by Charles II to 
stall his acceptance of covenanted kingship, Argyll, with the backing of the French Court and the 
States General of the Dutch Republic, was determined to maintain monarchy not just within 
Scotland, but to sustain the Stuarts as a British dynasty. However, division and ineptitude in the 
military command compounded by physical and financial exhaustion in the country debilitated 
Scottish resistance to Cromwellian occupation. With no prospect of relief from France or any further 
release of Scottish troops from Swedish or Dutch service, the Covenanting Movement opted for 
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